

Series I  
Correspondence,  
1932-1973

Box 1, Folder 23

July 26, 1945 -  
August 2, 1945

Frame: 0735

ComMTRenPacFleet  
c/o Fleet Post Office  
San Francisco, Calif.

Dear Fred:

I first want to write and thank you for your kindness to my representative, Lieutenant Commander Bonte, who was recently up there in connection with the PT boats and the prospective PT base at Shana Wan. Lieutenant Commander Bonte has now returned and can not speak too highly of the friendly way with which he was received and of the interest everyone displayed in the PT Command.

After leaving Okinawa, Lieutenant Commander Bonte returned to Guam, as you perhaps know, and it was then and there decided by the Commander in Chief that Shana Wan was to be assigned to my Command. I can not tell you how delighted I am at this Decision, which is exactly what the Motor Torpedo Boats Pacific should have, and which fits in so thoroughly with prospective operations.

Now that the base has been definitely assigned to Motor Torpedo Boats, I suppose that you are going to go ahead with surveying the place fully and with drawing up plans for a base. Therefore, I am taking the liberty of asking you, in drawing up the plans for the base, not to permit anyone to fly off hap-hazardly, but to consider the following:

(a) Rear-Admiral Cotter, Chief of the CBs in the Pacific, looked at Shana Wan and told me that it had all the earmarks of a perfectly marvelous base, and it was my impression that he considered that the area to the eastward of the base is the most logical place for the major portion of our base. It is true that there is some room on the little northern promontory where the Japanese town of Ofookah is located, and it was my impression that Admiral Cotter thought that certain shops and warehouses might well go in there; and, in particular, such shops as Torpedo, Gunnery, and the more dangerous warehouses. Even the ammunition dump might be in this area. This would isolate them from the rest of the base. It is my impression that he also said that the eastern side of Craford Island might be suitable as a fueling station and thus would also be well clear of the rest of the harbor. He indicated that that long promontory which reaches into the harbor from the south might be useful on its eastern side for certain docks, piers, and whatever might be suitable for a base at which the wind may blow from several directions.

(b) It was my belief that Admiral Cotter thought that the proper place for the quarters and the offices of the base should be on the eastern end. It is possible that that low section there can be filled in and that a considerable flat area can be obtained. As a matter of information, I have no way of telling how many PT boats and tenders will be up in this area now or later, but I feel that it is very important that space be available for expansion of any base that may be installed now. A base of this nature, which is practically a Headquarters Base, will require a limited number of buildings for use as offices by the Base Command as well as by my Command. It is not impossible at all that we will have to process personnel coming to our Fleet through this base in exactly similar manner as is being done at the present moment at Base 17 in Samar. Here there are

upwards of two thousand men coming and going to the PTs at the present moment. We will also need a building for registered publications, another one for hydrographic information, such as the issuance of hydrographic charts, and we certainly require a movie theater, which probably should be designed so that it will have cover against the winter. In view of the location of Shana Wan, and the necessity to contact Minecraft people and officers at Buckner Bay, there will be rolling stock which will have to be properly housed. All of this is being told to you as an indication of the needs of such a PT base and how it must, necessarily, have area for expansion. I know that you know all about this, but I hope you don't mind if I bring it to mind again, as I realize that you are very busy indeed.

I have not seen Shana Wan, and I chose it off the chart after discussing with the Civil Engineers on CinCPac's Staff what the prospects were in the whole area. I haven't seen one person who doesn't vote overwhelmingly in favor of Shana Wan as a base. Therefore, I must again thank you for your assistance in this matter.

If you can, I wish you would consult Admiral Cotter, who will surely be in that area any day, as he is always traveling through, about this base. Admiral Cotter has built many bases, and he has pointed out to me, on more than one occasion, how his Civil Engineer planners very often miss the boat in choosing areas. I hope that you will also allow me to see the plans before you actually put a building on the ground. Admiral Cotter told me that he would like to have quarters for himself at Shana Wan and I told him that I would be glad to have him build one for himself.

I understand that you are getting quite a work out which, in the end, is what I would expect would be satisfactory to Freddie Kirtland. You never took things easy in your life, and it is good they have got you up there where you will be able to get a lot of work done in the minimum time. Thanks again for everything. Best regards.

As ever,

R. W. BATES

Commodore Fred Kirtland, USN  
Commander Naval Bases, Okinawa

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ComMBRonPacFleet  
c/o Fleet Post Office  
San Francisco, Calif.

26 July 1945.

Dear Commander Warfield:

Thank you very much for your letter relative to my Staff. It was nice of you to help BuPers choose them. I appreciate, also, your kindness in pointing out the present opinion of the officers ordered to my Staff. However, I am not impressed with past performances too much, although often it is all that we have to go on, and I shall have to judge my officers on the basis of present performance of duty. Sometimes the success or failure of an officer - or man - depends upon the quality of his leadership. I sincerely trust that mine will be generally adequate to produce the best in each of my personnel.

I was, and still am, sorry that I have not obtained Lieutenant Commander Leeson. He is reportedly a most able officer and I have hopes that I will get him, if not as Operations Officer, then as Area Commander. Perhaps Admiral Pye will let him go after all!

Why was it that you let so many of your Melville men go? Was it that a new broom sweeps clean? And do you know why Commander Walsh became my Chief Staff Officer after I had requested one of three officers by name? It is not that I am critical of Commander Walsh, who appears to be a fine gentleman and capable officer, it is that I am critical of the fact that he was ordered to me without my having a word to say. It is usually customary to ask a flag officer whom he desires as his Chief of Staff and not to confront him with a "fait accompli". I'm going to investigate this one some day!

And now to business! Your establishment may be effective in teaching PT boats but, from here, it seems weak on discipline. I find that there is a tendency to be "non-reg", to wear anything at sea despite Fleet Orders to the contrary, which orders are nearly all designed to save life, and I think that the training in these matters should start at Melville. The PT fleet is a large concern and is getting larger. It no longer has any right to endeavor to cling to the thoughts of being "pirates". These ideas were for the early days of the Solomons when the fleet was small. Today, the picture is changing, and this must be recognized. Duty with the PTs must have a standing equivalent to that of the other branches of the Service but it will never have such standing if the PTs persist in endeavoring to be apart from the main Fleet.

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The PTs are here to stay! Let us make it such an important and capable arm that young officers - graduates of Annapolis in peace time - will seek service in it! That will be its yardstick.

My very best regards to you!

Very sincerely yours,

R. W. BATES

Commander T. G. Warfield, USN  
Motor Torpedo Boat Squadrons TADCEN  
Melville, Rhode Island

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ComMTRonsPacFleet  
c/o Fleet Post Office  
San Francisco, Calif.

27 July 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR: Commodore Allan Quynn.

1. This will serve to introduce to you, Lieutenant Everest, my Supply Officer in the Motor Torpedo Boat Squadrons, Pacific Fleet, whom I am sending to Pearl so that he can familiarize himself, under your direction, with ComSerPac's plans for the supply of the PT fleet in the Samar as well as in the Okinawa areas. Part of this information can be obtained here, but in my talks with Captain Leggett, Maintenance Officer of the 7th Fleet, as well as in my talks with ServRontEN, the matter had not been fully clarified as regards PTs at this date.
2. When the question arose about SPDC location, I sent in my dispatch, if you will remember, wherein I recommended Samar, if equivalent shipping to that at Guam was passing through here. I recommended that, merely because the set-up here was already under way, and it seemed a waste of government funds to endeavor to set up an SPDC elsewhere, providing there was no question of transportation involved. I think that Captain Leggett realizes there may be a question of transportation, because he told me that he expected to have room on Army ships in case there was no room available in naval vessels. This is transportation, all right, but it is not transportation that can be relied on. I prefer to know that I will be taken care of by the Navy.
3. My demands in the North, in the early stages, will not be great, and Lieutenant Everest has been informed enough on this line to be able to advise you, should you not know. However, I think you do know, even better than I, as I have not been well informed. My Staff had not existed until the past few days. Even now, I have no Communication Officer, and as the ship Communication Officer was recently detached, the Communication set-up is poor. I hope, presently, to have Communications so organized that I will fit thoroughly into the scheme of the Pacific, rather than being an isolated member of the Pacific team with no particular information.
4. I am very anxious that Lieutenant Everest and your Staff shall come to an understanding as to our present needs, and to our prospective needs should we use a large PT fleet in the North. I hope that you will have your personnel associated with the PT phase introduced to Lieutenant Everest with instructions to open up to him, so that he may have a good picture. He is a quite well informed young officer, and he knows pretty well what we require, having been in PT boats for a very long time. As far as I know, he is the only PT boat Supply Officer who has actually commanded a PT boat, and, strange as it may seem, for a while he actually commanded, on paper, the whole MTRonsPacFleet.

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5. I hope that this memorandum finds you in excellent health because, as the war in the Pacific spreads, your vast knowledge and evident capable leadership in Logistics will be more seriously felt than ever.

6. I had dinner with Lynde McCormick and J. M. Shoemaker last evening at J. M.'s place, and it was very nice. We had a most pleasant time. This part of the world is not "all bad", as you can see. Best regards. As ever,

Your old friend,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'R. W. Bates'.

R. W. BATES

ComBTRonsPacFleet  
c/o Fleet Post Office  
San Francisco, Calif.

27 July 1945

Dear H. T.:

Today I was most gratified to receive a small package from you which, when I opened it, I discovered was a belt with a single star belt buckle. I can not tell you in simple words how delighted I was that you had thought of me in such a nice way. There are very few people whom I know who think of others as much as you seem to do. The belt buckle and the belt are exactly what I should have desired - the belt fits me quite adequately with six inches to spare, and the buckle shines radiantly at all of my friends, which, naturally, is pleasing to me. Thanks.

I hope you don't mind my writing something important in this "thank you" note, but I was quite upset when ServPac rejected ComServ-Ronfen's recommendation - or was it ComServDiv110's recommendation - that the Acontius be provided with adequate evaporative equipment. When we reported that an average expenditure of twenty gallons per day per man was necessary, we chose a modest figure. Actually, the expenditures have been running somewhat higher than that. You can therefore imagine my consternation when I received a flat rejection from your office which stated that twelve gallons per day per man for all purposes, excepting, of course, feed water, was ample. Even in peace time, under the most rigid restrictions, I don't believe any ship ever reached twelve gallons per day but, instead, ran around sixteen gallons per day. I am afraid that, in the North, we will be severely handicapped by a shortage of water. It is the plan to use tenders, more than bases, as you know, and if a tender actually has to tend large numbers of personnel from the PT boats, the water making allowance must be ample. I don't know what you are going to do about this if you agree with me, but I still feel that it would be wise to install additional evaporation. Whether such equipment is available in the area or can be obtained by cannibalizing some other ship, I do not know. But I do think that it would be wise to reopen this evaporative matter in the sake of good engineering practice and the health and comfort of the personnel of the Flagship and the PT squadrons it may tend.

I hear rumors that you are back again in your old home, and I know that, for your sake, you enjoy that much better than you did. I think that the load placed on you at forward headquarters was too great and that you should have had assistance. Now that your assistant is there, if you will allow me to make a recommendation, I would suggest that you send him an engineer trained officer as his assistant. I know that I am presumptuous in making this statement, but I saw the load that was put on you, and I admired your most efficient manner of accomplishing it. But I couldn't help feeling that the load was more than you should have had to carry. A construction trained officer with you might have saved you a lot of needless work.

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Things are going along quite well with me out here. I am learning a lot about PT boats from the 7th Fleet, and it is a most interesting life. The young fellows in it are most enthusiastic and courageous. Coming, as they do, from multifold activities, they are inclined to be somewhat lacking in discipline - that is, nothing serious, but as regards uniform, upkeep of boats, and lack of knowledge of naval tradition. I plan to get after this phase of it, and have already started, in the Pacific Fleet, with what I hope will be successful results. It is a well known thing in naval warfare that an outfit which is undisciplined rarely ever performs as well as a disciplined unit, and as my policy has always been to endeavor to accomplish my results with a minimum loss, I must insist that I have discipline in order to assist me in accomplishing that objective.

I also note with concern that the engines of the PT boats are not performing properly. They should run upwards of 2,500 RPM at about 43 lbs. effective pressure. Many of them run only 1,800 RPMs. I cannot say that I am impressed. I am going to write to Mills about it.

With warmest personal regards to you and, once again, with many, many thanks for your thought of me, I am as ever,

Your old friend,

R. W. BATES

Rear-Admiral H. T. Smith  
Staff, ComServPac  
c/o Fleet Post Office  
San Francisco, California

ComMBRonsPacFleet  
c/o Fleet Post Office  
San Francisco, Calif.

27 July 1945

Dear Faulkner:

I suppose that you have wondered with increasing wonderment what had happened to your friend the Commodore who appeared in your area - dashed away to Guam - and then called you to Guam to assist him in planning. Well, the answer to that is simple. He is here at 7th Fleet Headquarters getting his flagship shipshape for operations in other areas, and studying PT boats.

Now that that matter has been cleared up to your satisfaction, I want to tell you that I look forward to seeing both you and Wark in the northern areas with your mighty Commands. As you know, I was allowed to choose what squadrons I preferred, and I told them that I wanted both you and Wark and wanted, also, the chance of bringing your Commands into the North. Searles is up there now and has, so far, done well. He has been on picket duty as well as on air-sea rescue, and, although he has caught no flies in the fly catcher operations, he has recovered a bunch of pilots and rescued PBMs. I hope that the situation up there will be satisfactory to handle us when we finally arrive.

I know that both you and Wark have wondered what your prospective operations were to be. Frankly, I don't know as yet. I imagine that you will be the senior officer in the North for a while. I want you to maintain in effect there the policies which I spoke of to you; among them being keeping your crew in reasonable uniform, training, and maintaining your ships highly efficient. I have talked your squadrons up quite a lot in the area of MBRons7thFleet, and I expect that they will maintain this reputation fully.

One thing that has bothered me in this area is the fact that the engines are not performing as reliably as I had hoped and stall on occasions. In addition to that, very few of them actually run up to the maximum speed desired. I have been highly critical of boats which do not make their proper RPM, and I will start a campaign soon to force the PT boats to make the required speed and to maintain it under the worst conditions. The safety of individuals in PT boats hinges to a large extent on the ability of the ship to perform its desired functions and, in particular, to manouver. The engines must perform adequately.

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I can assure you that I will be after your boats and Wark's on this subject, and I hope that when I see you, you will say to me, "Commodore, my boats have reached so and so" (some high figure).

I am merely writing this note to you, and through you to Lieutenant Wark, so that you will know that you haven't been forgotten by ComMBRonPacFleet, and to assure you that his interest in you today is what it was before; one of expectation of duty excellently performed.

Very sincerely yours,

R. W. BATES

Lieut. Clark Faulkner, USNR  
ComMBRon 37  
c/o Fleet Post Office  
San Francisco, California

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ComMTRonaPacFleet  
c/o Fleet Post Office  
San Francisco, Calif.

27 July 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR: Rear-Admiral W. H. P. Blandy.

1. This will serve to introduce to you Lieutenant Everest who is my Supply Officer in the PTs Pacific. He is not being introduced to you via this letter for the purpose of discussing PTs or Supply, but if you care to ask him about them, he is pretty well informed on those subjects. Instead, I want you to tell him what you advise concerning the Minneapolis. The story follows:
2. The Minneapolis was recommended by Admiral Joy for a Navy Unit Citation. The New Orleans was recommended at the same time for a Navy Unit Citation. The New Orleans, until recently, was not, in my mind, a very good ship, to which I think Turner concurs, but Turner told me that it was now vastly improved. So far as I know, the Minneapolis has always been an excellent ship.
3. The Minneapolis, as you perhaps well know, has been in the war from the beginning and has fought in many actions under four Captains - Captain Frank Lowry, Captain Charles Rosendahl, Captain Bates, and Captain Harry Slocumb. Among these actions may be cited the famous cases of the battle of Tassafaronga (Captain Rosendahl), the battle of Truk (Captain Bates), and the battle of Surigao Strait (Captain Slocumb). At the battle of Tassafaronga her bow was shot off and her engines received a torpedo hit which put practically all the boilers out of commission. Her damage was greater than that of the other ships, with the possible exception of the Northampton. But whether she was saved because of a greater heart in her crew and greater training than that in the Northampton, I do not know. Captain Rosendahl, naturally, will say that it was. She fought in the battle of Truk where, in company with the New Orleans and some salvos from the Iowa, she sunk a Japanese cruiser of the Katori class and one destroyer. If you will look into this matter, you will find - and this was reported by the aviators, and Sam Shoemaker well knew it - that the Minneapolis was on, on her second salvo at 21,500 yards and straddled steadily thereafter. Admiral Hustvedt told me that before the Iowa opened fire he saw the cruiser being heavily hit by the Minneapolis and on fire. The Minneapolis' pattern that day was reported by the aviators from the carrier Bunker Hill as being a little too large for most effective hitting. The New Orleans fired orange shells and, though her pattern was better than the Minneapolis' pattern, she had something wrong with her directors and never hit the target at all but was off in deflection. The Iowa pattern was reported as being better than the others when she fired, but the Gunnery Officer of the New Jersey, which was just ahead of the Iowa, told me - he is Gunnery

Officer for Admiral Oldendorf now - that the Iowa was short throughout. Vice-Admiral Giffen, whose Flag was in the Wichita at the time, told me, when he was detached, that both Admiral Spruance and he gave the credit for the sinking of the Katori class cruiser to the Minneapolis, but not to tell Sam Shoemaker that they had arrived at that decision, because it would upset Sam immeasurably. Frankly, I don't know the full story, but I do know that the Minneapolis was the ship the Japs fired at, at this time, and that four five-inch shells landed within fifty yards on her port side.

4. Immediately after that, the Minneapolis and the New Orleans destroyed a Japanese destroyer which had been left smoking by the other ships, but which was far from destroyed. I think that in this action the New Orleans and the Minneapolis deserve equal credit for the destruction of this destroyer, ~~and cruiser~~. Both the New Orleans and Minneapolis were forced to dodge torpedoes fired either by the cruiser or the destroyer at this time, and the torpedoes missed only by a matter of yards.

5. At the battle of Surigao Strait, the Minneapolis did her usual fine work and was straddled by the Japanese battle line but, fortunately, no hits were made. In addition to this, up to the time Admiral Joy had made his report, the Minneapolis had been in the entire Philippine Campaign, starting with the occupation of the Palau and including Surigao Strait, Leyte Gulf, and Lingayen Gulf. During all of these operations she was never hit. She suffered a near hit in the Marianas Campaign, which wounded, I think, two men. The reason that she has not suffered more damage in recent campaigns is not only because God willed it so, but because she was well trained. You, being a gunner of renown, know that this is so.

6. I am telling you about this because of your vast experience in this type of work and your experience, also, as a Chief of a bureau and as a Commander of an Amphibious Force. I personally think that Admiral Joy's letter, and I have told him so and he has agreed with me, was not all-embracing, and the conclusions that he arrived at were not necessarily in accordance with the letter authorizing the recommendations. I am not criticizing Admiral Joy here. That would be the last thing in the world that I would do as I am extremely fond of him and of his capabilities, but I feel free to comment this way because I have already talked to him about it.

7. Admiral Joy was not present at Tassafaronga - was not present at Truk - and was not present at Surigao Strait.

8. It is my personal belief that the old cruisers must be recognized, and I think that the Minneapolis is entitled to a Presidential Citation rather than a Navy Unit Citation. I have talked to officers whose ships have been recommended for a Navy Unit Citation and they admit that their records can not compare with that of the good ship Minneapolis.

9. What I should appreciate from you, therefore, is this: What has been done? Has the Minneapolis, in your mind, a chance for adequate recognition? Would you suggest that I do anything to give the ship a boost?

10. Before I sign off, I want to tell you that I thought, from the viewpoint of Chief of Staff to Rear-Admiral Deyo, that your handling of the pre-invasion set-up at Okinawa was excellent, and I wrote and told Vice-Admiral Oldendorf about it. You may not have known I was there, but Admiral Deyo asked if I couldn't come along with him, even though I was badly disabled and lying in the hospital ship. I told him that I would if the hospital ship would let me go. They agreed to do so on condition that I went over on the sick list, and was to be used for consultation only. I had a very badly damaged head, a sprained shoulder, and two sprained or cracked ribs. I went over, and, after having been there a few days, Admiral Deyo asked me if I wouldn't run the whole thing, which I endeavored to do. I had every opportunity to see you and your force operating, and, if a subordinate is allowed to say so to a senior, I hope you will allow me to say "damned well done".

Very sincerely yours,

R. W. BATES.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

COMTBronsPac/F17-1  
Serial 0064

ComTBronsPacFleet  
c/o Fleet Post Office  
San Francisco, California

WARCOL

RMB:01

CONTROL NO. TS-4068

28 July 1945.

From: Commander Motor Torpedo Boat Squadrons, PACIFIC Fleet  
To: Commander-in-Chief PACIFIC Fleet.  
Subject: Transfer of Motor Torpedo Boat Squadrons, SEVENTH Fleet  
to Motor Torpedo Boat Squadrons, PACIFIC Fleet.

1. ComTBronsPacFleet has been advised unofficially that Commander 7th Fleet plans to transfer, if satisfactory to CinCPac, eight squadrons of Elee PT boats (about 96 boats) and three squadrons of Higgins boats (about 36 boats) with five tenders. The contemplated date of transfer is tentatively set at 15 September.

2. ComTBronsPacFleet does not recommend that such a transfer be made for the following reasons:

(a) No facilities are available within Pacific Fleet to handle these PTs, and the tenders being provided are not adequate to handle satisfactorily more than five of these squadrons. In fact, sufficient MTB tenders are not available at this time in the 7th Fleet and Pacific Fleet combined to handle adequately these additional squadrons, plus those already in Pacific Fleet, without the use of bases.

(b) The major portion of such transferred PTs would probably remain in the Leyte area until called forward and until such time as facilities were available in Okinawa and/or until transportation became available. This time is very indefinite.

(c) This would require a completely new deputy command organization in the Leyte area which would parallel the existing command organization (MTBRons7thFleet) in that area. With the shortage of trained personnel, the logistics difficulties, and the lack of facilities for an additional command headquarters, to say nothing of the confusion incident to two parallel commands operating in the same area, it appears unwise to attempt such an additional deputy command organization.

3. ComTBronsPacFleet, therefore, suggests one of the following two courses of action:

(a) Retain all of the MTBRons7thFleet within the 7th Fleet and only transfer squadrons, tenders and ~~bases~~ to Pacific Fleet on demand. This has the obvious advantage that the complete operating command now functioning, and which is an excellent going concern, would retain command in its own area. It has the disadvantage that ComTBronsPacFleet could not exercise command, except type command, nor choose squadrons, tenders and ~~bases~~ as desired.

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Declassified by authority of  
General Declassification  
Schedule of Executive Order  
12958 dated 17 April 1995

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COMTBRonPac/P17-1  
Serial 0064

COMTBRonPacFleet  
c/o Fleet Post Office  
San Francisco, California

RWB:01

28 July 1945.

**Subject: Transfer of Motor Torpedo Boat Squadrons SEVENTH Fleet  
to Motor Torpedo Boat Squadrons PACIFIC Fleet.**

.....  
This (b) Transfer MTBRons7thFleet in its entirety to the Pacific Fleet. This would include the ~~transferance of all operating bases in the S.W. Pacific area~~ and would embrace, in addition, the conduct of operations not as yet completed; for example, in Borneo. The existing command organization referred to in (a) above would not be changed but the squadrons, instead of operating under the 7th Fleet, or possibly the Philippine Sea Frontier, would be operating under the Pacific Fleet. The present title of COMTBRon7thFleet would be changed to Deputy COMTBRonPacFleet, Southwest Pacific Area, or some equivalent title. This has the advantage that all of the PT boat operations in the Pacific would be placed under one command. If necessary, this deputy commander could be assigned additional temporary duty under Commander 7th Fleet to complete the operations now underway by that Fleet. Should the Philippine Sea Frontier require PT boats they could be temporarily assigned that command for duty. A disadvantage would be the possibility of confusion in command as regards CinCPac and CinCAFPac, through the 7th Fleet, if that command organization remains in existence.

4. COMTBRonPacFleet does not consider that there is much choice between 3(a) and 3(b) but, if possible, would prefer 3(b) because it is believed that that organization will be, eventually, the sole organization in the Pacific, and the sooner the basic organization is adopted the more smooth the resulting operations should be.

UNCLASSIFIED

R. W. BATES.

Declassified by authority of  
General Declassification  
Schedule of Executive Order  
12958 dated 17 April 1995

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0751



ComMTRonsPacFleet  
c/o Fleet Post Office  
San Francisco, California

July 30, 1945.

Dear Nee and Teddy:

I am, today, in receipt of a wedding announcement dated Newport, May 18, and addressed to me at the Naval War College, which accounts for its delay in delivery, announcing the marriage of your daughter Anita to a very fortunate young gentleman named Arthur Manice. I can not begin to tell you how happy I am at your happiness and at your daughter's happiness in this wedding. I don't know Mr. Manice, but the very fact that your daughter has chosen him and that you have evidently approved, indicates to me that he is well worthy of attachment to the Grosvenor clan.

I have always liked Anita. She is a swell person, and I like to think of the days back there at your home in Newport when we all used to talk about many things. Yours is a most happy and, shall I say, homey family and, therefore, all of your children are simply bound to be charming, and they are exactly that. I saw you, Teddy, as you recollect, out in Pearl, and I had hoped to hear of you being on a carrier, as you wished, but instead, I discovered that you were "out". Then I discovered the reason you were out was that you wished to be home at your daughter's wedding. I want you to know that I think you did the right thing, although you have never asked me but probably pondered about it. There was no need to retain you in the Navy at all, because you were well past any age for serious combat - although you, I know, are furiously denying it - and you properly belonged home with your family.

I shall get very formal now and say to you that, on behalf of the Navy, we thank you for your performance of duty which was always excellent, and we regret that we have had to lose you. We hope that, in the future, you will always think of the Navy with satisfaction and love, and will do all that you can to insure that we persist in strength throughout the years.

I notice that your house is listed as at Wyndham, and I don't know quite where that is, but I recollect that you told me it was somewhere up on a hill. I hope that it is as nice a house as the one that you were in before, but I have no doubt that it is because any house that you are in, Nee, and have a hand in administering, immediately exudes a refreshing

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atmosphere of good cheer, happiness, and good breeding. The latter I consider most important because, today, we are careless of such things - particularly our young people - and it is only as one gets older that "values" become important. Some day I shall appear in Newport and dash frantically up to your estate so that I may breathe for myself the atmosphere of your Valhalla.

Best regards to both of you and, believe me, I miss you, although the frequency of my letters to you would not so indicate. Seriously, I do look forward to seeing you again some day. Best to you, as always,

Yours sincerely,

R. W. BATES

Mrs. Theodore Grosvenor  
Wyndham  
Newport, R. I.

0753

ComMFRonsPacFleet  
c/o Fleet Post Office  
San Francisco, Calif.

30 July 1945.

Dear Jimmy:

My Operations Officer, Lieutenant Commander Bonte, has returned from his trip to Guam and Okinawa and has told me in glowing terms of his reception at your hands. For this I am extremely grateful to you but, as I told Bonte, I was not surprised as you had been trained to thing along logical lines, and all that we had to do was to sit tight and the correct things would be ordered by you without help from us.

I wanted Shana Wan long ago, as you will remember. Then, somehow, opposition of some nature developed against any base there at all, which, as CinCPac now plainly sees, was not the correct answer. There must be PT bases at intervals where the PTs may retire for overhaul, where a personnel office for the distribution of personnel may be located, where registered publications may be obtained, where engines may be overhauled, and where other matters incident to any base can be handled. I expressed a need for such a base prior to leaving Guam, and I got everyone interested. Admiral Cotten made an inspection, as did the people at Okinawa, and now, lo and behold, Shana Wan has become officially the base for PTs at Okinawa. It is simply swell.

As a matter of information, the MEO base and a branch SPDC were desired at Okinawa, and preferably at Shana Wan. Heavy pressure has been put on me by Service Force, 7th Fleet, and particularly by Captain Leggett, Maintenance Officer, to support him in his desire to establish the MEO here on Manicani Island. I refused at first and told him that I expected that there would be an eventual release from CinCPac favoring the base at Okinawa, which is over one thousand miles north of here, and that I told him that I would never consent to not having an SPDC (sub) at Okinawa. The establishment of the MEO at Okinawa is not vital unless inadequate shipping is to be expected. Captain Leggett was here the other day and said that, if naval shipping was not available, Army shipping would be. As I seemed to be the only one holding out for Okinawa, I finally agreed to Manicani for the sake of harmony, and sent a message to ServPac to that effect.

As a matter of information, we normally estimate that for every three squadrons, the engines of one squadron must be overhauled once a month. That is, as three squadrons have, as an average, one hundred and eight engines, and as about one-third of the boats are operating each day, we may estimate that thirty-six engines per month, or about one-third of the one hundred and eight engines, must be overhauled monthly to keep the three squadrons operating at full efficiency. A unit, such as the E-12 unit now at Okinawa, is capable of overhauling about twenty engines per month. Therefore, the recommendation of ComServPac, concerning the location of this unit, and providing for expansion in the Okinawa area is sound, if a large number of our PTs will be operating in that area. This location is particularly sound as it will avoid shipping difficulties, and as the Packard spares, which other-

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wise would all be in this area, will be partially assigned to that area for use at the MEO at Okinawa, they will be available, in an emergency, for a replacement on any boat. This matter has been bothering me here for some time, but I had planned, also, in case Samar were finally assigned, to ask that an SPDC for Packard spares be available in the Okinawa area.

I was awfully glad that Lieutenant Commander Bonte told you of how well PT Squadron 31 was doing up there under command of Lieutenant Searles. This is an experienced squadron - Searles, himself, wears the Navy Cross - and it is, because of their experience, that I wanted them to be in that area. This squadron has already rescued a number of pilots, has shot up a number of barges and a lugger, I believe, as well as canoes in which Japanese soldiers were fleeing Okinawa, and it is quite probable that they succeeded in denying to the Japanese an escape route to the islands north of Okinawa. As every dead Jap is a good Jap, it is readily apparent that this squadron has been highly effective. I have been told that General Stillwell has twice seen Lieutenant Searles himself, and spoken in a most friendly way of the performance of the PTs.

The air-sea rescue work that they are doing is most important and, although most PT officers do not like to perform this duty, and have repeatedly asked me to tone it down a bit as they are looking for combat, I have had to suggest to them that I think that it may become one of our most vital duties in the North. With the great number of airfields now on Okinawa, and with the many others to be constructed on Okinawa and the adjacent islands, the tremendous number of planes flying to Japan may require very considerable air-sea rescue support. The PT boat, being very well armed for so small a boat, and being a good sea boat, is admirably fitted for this duty. It has good defense against the Jap suicide planes in that it has, in addition to its speed and its armament, a high factor of maneuverability. The Higgins boat can turn in a very small circle and has even greater maneuverability than the Elco boats which have considerable maneuverability themselves.

The load on our squadron up there, at present, is very, very great as it is being used to the maximum extent. But, so far, the squadron has succeeded in carrying out its commitments. There is a lot of confusion in command up there at present as aviators consider that they can call on the squadron for air-sea rescue duties without regard to any other commitments the squadron may have, while, at the same time, Admiral Cobb calls on them for patrol without consideration of their air-sea rescue commitments. This condition is not sound, and it seems to me that there should be one clearing house for the whole affair. I expect that I will have that function when I reach that area. Fortunately, the arrival of new PT boats will considerably relieve the load on Searles' squadron, although I think the demand for PTs will increase as the PT boats arrive because the use of more and more planes will require more and more air-sea support. It appears to me that PT boats operating in conjunction with submarines can accomplish a great deal along this line. A PT boat can remain at sea at slow speed for sufficient time to cover between nine hundred and a thousand miles. However, this is its maximum radius and should not be approached unless unavoidable. The PT can operate at twenty-seven knots and cover a distance of over four hundred miles.

I told Lieutenant Commander Bonte to talk to you about prespective operations along the China Coast, and when I was there before, I spoke to Captain Layton about it, but he indicated that there wasn't much on that coast. It seemed to me that if you are going to have cruiser sweeps running up along the coast there, that it might be a simple thing to have the PTs operate at night along the China Coast under cover, in a degree, of the cruisers. The idea would be something about like this: The PT boats would move over to about one hundred miles or less from the Chinese Coast where they would fuel from tenders or from an oiler, and would then be ready for a strike along the coast. They would fuel under the protection of the cruisers which would be passing to the westward. Air cover would be provided either from land bases (Marine) or from jeep carriers. Just before dark, the PTs would move toward their designated area on the China Coast to arrive just about sundown, and would raid along that coast during the remainder of the night, after which they would retire to the eastward and refuel once again under the protection of the cruisers and the aircraft. I spoke to Admiral McCormick about this and drew some diagrams about it, and he seemed to think that it was very possible under the set-up now existing, of which he seemed to have more knowledge than I did. There is no more reason why raids can be made along the Japanese Coast than along the Chinese Coast, and I can see plainly that if PTs were available up in the North with Halsey, they would be able to accomplish a tremendous amount of destruction in, for example, the Inland Sea. Unfortunately, such operations are not feasible at present. There is no use sending PTs along any coast - Chinese Coast included, if there is no market, but it seems to me that with the Japs retiring, as they seem to be, along the China Coast, and with the dreadful power of our air and its destructive effect on their railways and roads, a natural result would be to force them to the water close inshore. We should accomplish, in that case, exactly what we accomplished off Norther Okinawa, and should wipe out anything that is found. This is not a thought out estimate because no information is available here at present, either of the market along the Chinese Coast or the movement of cruisers through the China Sea. Also, of course, the question of mines is one that has to be considered, but it is my understanding that, as a general thing, PTs are safe from mines. I am about to submit an official request for an official answer in this matter, which I gave to Captain Hill when I was there before, as a question unsolved. I do know this: Admiral Struble told me that they ran the PTs over the mine fields without any disaster, whatsoever, at Corregidor, although, for some reason, they finally stopped it.

I sent a message the other day, which you may have noted, asking ComPhibsPac for a conference so that I might discuss future operations. No reply has yet been received. I don't know where he is, as a matter of fact, but I think that I do.

I want to thank you for everything you are doing for my Command, and to let you know that I am very appreciative of the effort you have put in to keep us going. The PT fleet is a very able and conscientious fleet, and I think that it is also a delicate fleet. Personnel have had very little training in discipline - they are an independent type and many have never had any family discipline of any kind. The PTs have contributed to this

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more than lessened it. So, I am gradually putting on the pressure to cut out "the pirate Navy" and to put them down as part of good, old USN. I tell them that the day of the few, erratic squadrons, which, while highly heroic, seized more newspaper headlines than the larger forces did, are over, and that they are merely part of the big machine which is bringing victory. I know that they don't like this. They prefer to be one of the "Expendables," but not, of course, actually expendable. You can't blame them for desiring a certain amount of publicity, as many of them have been in the papers from the day they were born, but it isn't part of the naval method of winning war, which I hope they are gradually learning. I don't want you to think from this that I am critical of them. On the contrary, I am very proud of them, but it has fallen on me, just in the sense as it did with the underwater teams, to make them realize that there are no prima donnas in the PT fleet, but that the motto of the Three Musketeers applies in all cases: "All for one, and one for all".

With best regards to everybody, I am as ever,

Your old friend,



R. W. BATES.

Commodore James Carter, USN  
CinCPac Advanced  
c/o Fleet Post Office  
San Francisco, Calif.

ComMTBRonsPacFleet  
c/o Fleet Post Office  
San Francisco, Calif.

30 July 1945.

Dear Gus:

I received an officer on my Staff the other day from the War College, and it brought to mind the fact Newport was still on the map, even though we out here in these forward areas don't really ever hear much about it, or about any other city not located in this immediate area. And so, as I was sitting here thinking a few minutes ago about the happy days that I had had in Newport, and of my friends there, I thought that I would drop you a letter to let you know that I am still out here with the boys.

Another thing that reminded me of Newport was the fact that this morning I received an announcement, from Teddy and Neo Grosvenor, of the marriage of their daughter Anita to some fellow named Manice. As I am very fond of the Grosvenors and, in particular, of this daughter Anita, I couldn't help thinking once again of the Newport set-up. Someone is asleep there, however, because the announcement of the wedding was dated May 18 and was addressed to the Naval War College, when, in fact, I have been out here in the Pacific for - lo! - these past two years.

At this time of the year Newport and, of course, the rest of New England is beautiful, and Bailey's Beach, I know, despite hurricanes, is probably crowded with the most famous social names in America. Even that horse that you used to ride, and perhaps still ride, I know looks forward each morning to his chance of galloping along the highways of that glorious area. And the thought of horse reminds me of the famous story of the lame pheasant, which you shot to put out of its pain, and then discovered, to your horror, that it was tied with a string and was the private property of a little girl living closely by. You took a good deal of friendly ribbing on that one, Gus, my friend, and I enjoyed a good laugh over it. In the end, however, you were probably quite right. A disabled bird is about as useless as a legless horse and, you, riding the horse, did to the poor little pheasant what you would have done to a wounded horse - you shot it.

I hope that Fanny is in fine shape. She was always very nice to me and I thoroughly enjoyed the frequent times when she and I sat out in that nook off the kitchen and watched the Master Cook preparing his savory meals for our delectation. I suppose that, even now, that famous chowder is resting on the bar in the club and the famous rum cocktails, which you made so pleasantly, are being passed around the pool table, as the greatest pool players in the world (?) make shots to the loud amusement of the onlookers,

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of which the quietest were never Gus White and Rafe Bates - Gustafus Adolphus and Batsolini.

I am getting along quite well out here, and although I am no longer the Chief of Staff to Vice-Admiral Oldendorf, I have a very interesting Command of Motor Torpedo Boats, Pacific. This puts me in command of the entire torpedo boat fleet of the whole Pacific Ocean, which is a very large command and a most interesting one. The young men, who operate our craft, are a very brave and gallant lot and I have great admiration for them.

Being in command of this unit has an additional advantage in that it keeps me in the combat areas of the Pacific for a much longer time than otherwise might have occurred. I have already been out here now over two years and it seems about like yesterday when I left Newport and my many friends there.

By the way, an old friend of yours - the one who wanted you to be with him in Miami - will probably be in Newport shortly. He is a Vice-Admiral now, as you perhaps know, and has done a perfectly wonderful job in the Pacific. At one time he commanded all of the cruisers and the destroyers in the Pacific, and now he is a Sea Frontier Commander, which he has taken command of with his usual understanding and gusto. I don't know anybody in this area who is thought more of, or who thinks more of his fellows, than does this gentleman. He is always thinking of some way of insuring that his officers and men are given some sort of recreation when they return to an area over which he may have jurisdiction. He is a great administrator and, needless to say, a wonderful friend. I hope that he passes through Newport, because I know that you are very fond of him, and I know that it will do you all good to see one another again.

There isn't much new to report on out here. You get the press dispatches every day, and readily see what an excellent job has been done by Admiral Halsey and his forces. I get moved quite a lot when I think of the power of Uncle Sam and, although I am, in a sense, one of them, and this may sound vain, I also get moved at the remarkable manner with which our young men - certainly not trained to war - have entered into this life and death struggle with clear hearts and high heads and have taken the deadly enemy, man for man, with most successful results to themselves. What a shock their conduct has been to the enemy!

As a matter of personal interest, I was awarded a second Legion of Merit the other day for my performance as Chief of Staff to Oldendorf during the Philippine Campaign, and I liked getting it very much indeed. When I was given this assignment I was advanced to Commodore, which has some advantages, and I am glad to say that I am, likewise, enjoying that assignment, also.



Please remember me to everybody in the area, most of whom I still have a deep affection for. In particular, I hope that you will remember me to those devastating pool players and crap shooters at the Reading Room who assisted in making my stay in Newport so eternally pleasant that I hearken back to it in my heart on many an occasion. With warmest regards to you, I am as ever,

Your old friend and opponent,

R. W. BATES.

Mr. Gustav J. S. White  
Newport, Rhode Island

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ComMTRonsPacFleet  
c/o Fleet Post Office  
San Francisco, California

2 August 1945.

Dear Duffy:

I am writing to you for several reasons, one of which I hope you will be able to act on promptly, as I have delayed somewhat in writing to you, owing to the fact that I have been very busy from Borneo to Leyte. In the first place, Captain Hill, the Gunnery Officer to the Commander-in-Chief at Guam, has requested that I send him my comments for Section 8 of the Action Report on the Okinawa Operations, which comments I gave to Admiral Deyo. Admiral Deyo, as you know, did not publish them in the form in which written, and evidently preferred to delete anything that was critical. The Department is quite interested in what is thought about cruising dispositions against suicide planes, etc., and I had written a considerable amount about that in my comments. You are the only person that I can write to who should have a copy of these in his file. If you haven't them, and the Birmingham is around, you might slip over there quietly to see if you can't get them out of the Birmingham. It appears as if the comments we made before Admiral Deyo were well thought of on the Big Staff, because they were the first things I was asked for when I saw the Gunnery Officer about three weeks ago.

Secondly, I suppose you would be interested to know that the DSM for which I was recommended by Admiral Oldendorf, and which you spoke to me about, was not allowed. I do not believe it was disallowed by Admiral Kincaid, but, instead, by Admiral Van Hook's Board of Awards, as Admiral Kincaid was away. Although I did not have too much hope of getting it, I, nevertheless, could not believe that the recommendation of a Vice-Admiral of the high standing and reputation of Admiral Oldendorf would be disregarded for the reason that I was not a Flag Officer at the time. However, I have recently seen where Captains received the DSM. It was very kind of you and others of the Staff, such as Captain Solomons, to propose it. They have awarded me a second Legion of Merit, which, of course, is nice. The Legion of Merit is a perfectly proper award, and I would view it most happily were it not for the fact that it is now being issued like ice-cream sodas to almost anybody who has never done anything, and especially on shore.

I went over and saw Admiral Van Hook and investigated to be sure that all of our recommendations had gone through. So far as I could see, they had. It's too bad that the Admirals, whom we have recommended, have not recommended their Captains. Captain Grassie, Idaho, says that he has received nothing in a year, but hears that he was recommended at Okinawa.

The thing that disappoints me is this: Had that recommendation for a DSM been delayed for a short time, it could well have been given to me by Admiral Oldendorf. I suppose that it still could be awarded as an over-all

award for the period from September until May if Admiral Oldendorf considers that I was worthy of it. Then I should have had an award signed by Jesse B. Oldendorf. It seems strange that these awards that I have now are signed by Nimitz, Kincaid, and Barbey, with nothing at all from our great, fighting Commander. If anybody is entitled to anything signed "J.B.O.", it is those of us who worked with him so long and who, under his wise guidance, were able to crack the Japs for good.

I noted with sincere regret that the Irish team has gradually been broken up - first Cassidy left, then I left - you know my grandmother was a Lynch - then Sullivan left, leaving only Duffy and Flynn, with the possible exception that perhaps Donoho is Irish but spells it Italian. Sullivan is a very nice fellow, and I have a very deep regard for him. I hope to hear that he is enjoying his new assignment. If you can, send me his address and I will write him a letter. What I say to him will be in safe hands because the yeoman typing this is also an Irishman named O'Neill. My new job is getting along well, and I know that I am going to enjoy it, although I will always miss not being there with you "harps" when the enemy planes start buzzing around. My stay on Admiral Oldendorf's Staff will always be one of the most pleasant experiences of my life, and I don't think that any Commander ever had more devoted supporters than he did in his old Staff.

I hear that the Major is now a Lieutenant-Colonel, which, of course, is gratifying. When do you and Flynn move up? Best regards to everyone on the Staff and to any of that office force who may remember me in a friendly way. Take care of yourself and keep Saint Patrick's flag flying when the chips are down.

Very sincerely yours,

R. W. BATES.

Lieut. (jg) Wm. H. Duffy, jr., USN  
U.S.S. Tennessee,  
c/o Fleet Post Office  
San Francisco, California